Friday, May 16, 2014

2014 Election Results - A Quick Analysis

The verdict is out. The BJP led by Modi has got a comfortable majority on its own and with its alliance partners almost a two-thirds majority, the latter being critical because they can make fundamental constitutional amendments with that kind of numbers. 

What are the implications of such a victory? 
Before I get into that a brief on the character/background of the BJP. BJP is the political front of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) which is a Hindu Nationalist organization very similar to the SS of the Nazis. The RSS has grassroots cadre which protects the Hindu cultural and social traditions, and through this cadre they propagate hate for other communities, especially Muslim and Christian. Other communities like Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains are not seen by them as communities having a separate identity but as sects of Hinduism. It is a highly conservative organization with a command structure like the army and was founded by Keshav Hegdewar a medical doctor who was inspired by Adolf Hitler. It started as a Hindu social organization to protect Hinduism from the Islamic and Christian influences but soon became a kind of paramilitary organization developing disciplined Hindu cadres using military training learning from the Nazis. Hindu supremeism (and at that point upper caste) became its core value. During British colonial rule their target was the British government and British culture but post Independence given the dominance of the Congress party which was promoting a secular India and not supporting the concept of Hindu nationhood they floated the Jana Sangh party to contest elections against the Congress. 

The Congress leadership viewed the RSS as an extremist organization and banned it a number of times and thus prevented the Jana Sangh from flowering. Post 1977 after the Indira Gandhi imposed National Emergency (2 years when all fundamental rights were suspended) the Jana Sangh merged into the Janata Party alliance of all anti-Congress parties, including the left. But that alliance did not last very long and splits happened leading to the emergence of the BJP. It was only in the late eighties that the RSS became aggressive in pushing the BJP to take a strong Hindu nationalist stance what we call Hindutva in India and this led to the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh wherin BJP leaders backed by cadres of the RSS and its violent outfits like the Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. That was the turning point in BJPs growth trajectory. It had captured the larger Hindu mindset and thenceforth Hindutva became its core value in its politics. Such a political ideology has grown from strength to strength and the current election results demonstrate this very well - the Hindu vote, especially upper and middle caste, has consolidated itself behind BJP.

The RSS has played a key role to make this happen in these elections first by seconding all its cadre to BJP but more importantly in the Nazi style promoted an individual through selling the Modi brand as though Modi was fighting a Presidential election. And this clicked with the masses because the incumbent PM was projected as a weakling controlled by remote control by the Congress party President, and hence it created a desire amongst masses for a strong leader to stall the policy paralysis and push "development and growth" (synonymous with the so called Gujarat model of Modi) hard. The results also show that the BJP has broken the caste based regional parties in north and central India by creating a schism between the Congress and the regional parties thus splitting the lower caste and dalit votes that gave a strategic advantage to the BJP and this explains the huge number of seats the BJP won in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where all the caste based regional parties (Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, Janata Dal United etc.) have been decimated. And the Congress has been virtually decimated from across the country reduced to less than 50 seats in contrast to the more than 200 they had in the last Lok Sabha (see the link below, a map which reveals the wide reach of saffron, the colour associated with the BJP).

So what are the implications of such an election result? The much hyped Gujarat model of Modi will be at the centre of their economic policy. What this means is that private business will be promoted in a big way using state resources. Land, especially rural land, will be taken away from farmers, adivasis, dalits and urban slum settlements with minimal compensation and handed over to select industrialists at throwaway prices if not free for "development"; mining contracts will be given freely by taking away land from rural and tribal communities, and crony capitalism will get a huge  boost. Taxation, especially for business, will be liberalized, tax expenditures will be increased, social sector expenditures like health, education and especially food and employment security will be drastically reduced and private partnerships or outright pravatization will be promoted. The BJP (and especially Modi) is clearly opposed to the NREGS and food security as they feel that such "charities" are dehumanizing. So according to Modispeak people should in the true Gujarati ethos engage in dhanda or business and not be subject to humiliation of state sponsored job guarantees and food subsidies.

On the human rights and socio-cultural front new challenges would be presented. Minorities, especially Muslims and Christians, on one hand and dalits and adivasis on the other hand would face further exclusion and their human rights threatened. There would be a push for Hindu nationalism and prominence to the Hindu ethos and culture as Indian or Bhartiya and the non-Hindus would be expected to fall in line in the name of inclusion. 

Transparency and accountability that had seen major gains since the Right to Information Act was put in place is likely to see reversals if not outright dismissal. To keep the gains would require stronger civil society vigilance and activism. Budgets for the social sectors would also be threatened because of the expected leverage towards privatization. Stronger efforts by civil society would need to be made to not only protect these budgets but also to demand larger shares, especially for health, education , food security, livelihoods and pensions.

With the lotus (the BJP election symbol) fully afloat and blooming progressive civil society would need to mobilize strategically and effectively to see that the new regime does not overstep our constitutional rights and social benefits that we have a right over as tax payers and citizens. To conclude an extract from a poem Onus is On Us (anonymous):
............
They might have the seats, the two seventy two
But the country belongs to me and to you
And we are a billion people, a billion and plus

At the end of the day the onus is on us

Elections in India: Transparency, Accountability and Corruption

Posted on  by 
This post was written by Ravi Duggal, Program Officer at the International Budget Partnership.
Elections are underway in the world’s largest democracy. With over 800 million voters spanning 543 political constituencies, voting will last until mid-May. And transparency and accountability are shaping up to be key issues for voters.
Turbulence in the last few years
The last two years have seen major upheaval in Indian politics and the general mood is against the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) – a centre-left coalition led by the Congress party. Many believe the UPA has underperformed. Economic growth has slowed from around 9 percent just a few years ago, to less than 5 percent last year; and flagship development programs have seen a downslide in performance due to underfunding and mismanagement.
Concerns over corruption have sparked widespread discontent. Civil society organizations (CSOs) led a countrywide anticorruption campaign that saw many people take to the streets to demand stronger laws and greater oversight. In 2013, this campaign coalesced into a new political party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP or Common Peoples Party). Running on a platform of direct democracy, citizen’s participation, and accountability, the AAP successfully competed in state elections in Delhi.
Polls, however, point to a victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). There is a wave of support for its controversial leader Narendra Modi. But polling may underestimate a silent coalition of groups that feel threatened by Modi’s strong Hindu-nationalist leanings.
BJP India
Supporters of BJP in Kerala, April 2014 (Creative Commons/gordontour)
Transparency and citizen engagement in action
With the growing attention to open and accountable governance, and discontent over business-as-usual, what might these elections mean for efforts to increase transparency and participation around government budgeting? Thanks to new technology and increased transparency, citizens, CSOs, and the media are engaging in the election in ways not seen before in India. A wealth of information is available on prospective candidates, everything from their legislative performance to details of their personal finances. CSOs, such as PRS Legislature and Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), have analyzed and publicized such publically available information, and the media has picked up on it and run stories on the more high-profile candidates.
The Election Commission (EC) also has been swamped with complaints over code of conduct violations by political campaigners. High-profile examples include Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar’s urging supporters to vote twice, and top leader in the BJP Amit Shah’s hate speech against Muslims.
Although elections are but one aspect of governance, and we should be cautious about overreaching, these appear to be promising signs of the willingness of both the government to make information publicly available and other stakeholders to use this information to engage more fully.
But all bark and no bite?
Unfortunately, the EC’s response to violations has so far been disappointingly lenient. Sharad Pawar, for example, was able to pass off his calls for people to vote twice as a joke and simply apologized when questioned by the EC; Amit Shah wasbanned from campaigning, but only in Uttar Pradesh. One might have expected — or hoped — that such exceptional violations would have resulted in cancelation of candidature.
So we are observing that while transparency, access to information, and citizen engagement is strong, appropriate actions have not been taken. And hence accountability fails.  This risks creating a sense of futility and frustration among citizens who may get disenchanted with the process.
What we can expect
There remains a great deal of political fluidity, and we won’t know the final outcome until results are announced on 16 May. But there are three possible scenarios, each with different implications for budget advocacy campaigners:
  • The UPA coalition returns to power: Business as usual. Guarded liberalization paired with stronger investments in social sectors. Budget advocacy would be focused on pushing for substantial increases in social sector spending to improve service delivery.
  • A BJP victory: A major shift in economic and fiscal policies. We would likely see markets take centre stage, more rapid liberalization, corporations being taxed less, and reduced social spending. This will threaten many flagship development programs, which may continue but with a greater emphasis on public-private partnerships. Here budget advocates may want to shift their focus to protecting what is there and preventing the privatization of public services.
  • A new coalition emerges: If a third front manages to form a government (most likely with support of the Congress party), socialist policies will be back on the agenda. Flagship development programs would be secure and probably get a further boost.
Whoever comes to power will face an electorate hungry for better governance and accountability — including accountability for how public funds are managed to meet the people’s needs and priorities. People want corruption eliminated and public services improved. Greater access to information is changing how citizens interact with government, and CSOs have shown themselves to be a political force in their own right.
Unless the new government can deliver, they may yet face people taking to the streets with their demands.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

Making ESIS Work for UAHC

Current Scenario
The ESIC, created by an Act of Parliament in 1948, is the most important social health insurance program for the organized sector working classes. It today has an annual budget of over Rs. 10,000 crores and reserve funds of more than Rs. 25,000 crores[1]. With 151 hospitals, 32,349 hospital beds, 20346 medical personnel (7340 doctors) and 18,501 other staff  and per insured employee medical spend of Rs.2551 it is a huge medical establishment, somewhat similar to the armed forces (38328 beds and Rs. 5914 crore medical expenditure – Rs.19713 per employee) and Railways (13963 beds and Rs. 1370 crore medical expenditure – Rs.9660 per employee).  Table 1 details ESIC expenditures over the last five years.
The ESIS is not an ideally functioning social health insurance program (see the story in Box 1). It looks huge in numbers with a coverage of 6.18 crore beneficiaries with a per capita expenditure of Rs.1253 which is 2.5 times of general government health expenditure for the same year. But it is not universal access even for the organized sector employees; infact it covers only 42% of the organized sector employment and by design it is largely targeted at blue collar workers thus fragmenting social security even in the organized sector. While huge investments have been made in ESIS as evidenced by the infrastructure and human resources for healthcare, all this is poorly structured and managed. Despite having a robust hospital and clinic network the utilization and occupancy rates are very low. One reason could be poor quality of services (vacant positions of doctors and specialists are huge) and the other a growing reliance on out sourcing to private practitioners and private hospitals, especially the latter.
The limited data available in the Annual Reports shows that outpatient care, especially in larger cities where private practitioners called insurance medical practitioners provide services the latter is used more frequently. For instance in Mumbai which is the largest ESIS hub having the largest hospitals in 2009-10, 52,203 outpatients were treated at ESIS facilities in contrast to 129,447 by private panel doctors and similarly for specialist care 48,557 attended ESIS facilities and 63195 attended private clinics. Increasingly hospital care is also being paid for to use over 600 empaneled private hospitals (reimbursed Rs. 180 crore in 2009-10) keeping the occupancy rates of ESIC’s own hospitals below 50% (in the largest ESIS hospital, the 700 bedded MGM hospital in Mumbai the occupancy was as low as 31%). 
Anecdotal stories tell us that the ESIC doctors are primarily used to obtain medical certificates so that workers can access the various cash benefits under the scheme. In 2010-11 there were a total of 406000 hospitalizations and 2.34 crores outpatient incidence (4.39 crore contacts). This seems to be a very low utilization rate when compared with the NSSO morbidity surveys for the general population. For outpatient care an annual incidence of 390 per 1000 as against 45 per 1000 for 2 weeks as per NSSO and only 6.8 per 1000 hospitalizations annually compared to 26 per 1000 as per NSSO. Is this low morbidity and utilization because of poor quality services or is it that the ESIS covered population is healthier because it is well looked after? Or is it that even ESIS covered persons are using the private sector and paying out of pocket? We definitely need more evidence on this.

Table 1
  

Another issue that emerges when we assess the information from the Annual Report is that in the last few years, while the canvass of ESIS has expanded due to the increase of wage ceiling to Rs.15,000 per month, the attention of ESIC is moving away from the employee who has contributed from his/her wages to a new arena of action – medical education. The ESIC Board has sanctioned 18 medical colleges and 9 dental colleges besides 12 PG institutes. The establishment for these is under full swing as can be seen from the increasing capital expenditures coming from the reserve funds. Should a social health insurance agency be entering the field of medical education? This is likely to further damage the reputation of ESIS as well take it into a direction which will not be in favour of the working class ( or is it that insured persons have been promised a quota of medical seats!).
What is also striking when we look at ESIC budgets is that even when the ESIC has a huge surplus every year the state governments have to continue to subsidize medical care expenses of ESIC from the general health budget. Thus in 2010-11the total medical care expenditure was Rs 2124 crores but more than half of this, that is Rs.1294 crores came from the general health budgets of the state and union governments.

What Needs to be Done
ESIS is not a single isolated program. It is one important part of a compact of the social security system within the country so it needs to be assessed in that context. The few benefits that we have in India today are spread across various Ministries ranging from administrative departments to Ministry of Labour, Social Welfare, Social Justice, Women and Child Development, Ministry of Health etc.. resulting in segmentation and fragmentation.
What must also be noted is that the nature of social security provided varies a lot for different sections of the population. At one end of the spectrum the civil services employees of Central and State governments get a full range of benefits as defined by the ILO. For instance, their retirement benefits alone (pension, PF, gratuity etc.. excluding healthcare) were Rs.166,170 crores in 2010-11[2] (as much as 2.11% of GDP). At another end are the below poverty line (BPL) population who get adhoc benefits under various welfare and social assistance schemes. For instance in 2010-11 such benefits across the country amounted to Rs.146,248 crores or 1.85% of GDP (social assistance schemes/pensions for BPL, SC, ST, nutrition, housing and labour welfare for unorganized sectors)[3]. If we include healthcare and water supply and sanitation this figure increases to Rs. 248,456.22 crores[4]. Thus in the Indian context we need to differentiate these different benefits that range from comprehensive social security (civil service employees) to ad hoc social assistance programs targeted at different poor and vulnerable groups.
It is clear from budgetary allocations/expenditures that social security benefits in India are highly discriminatory. Civil servants and defense services employees as well as a small proportion of private sector employees, who anyway benefit from their secure and well paid employment, have life-long social security of a very high standard. On the other hand, those who struggle for an existence all their life get ad hoc benefits from residual resources of the budget, in most cases if they are below the poverty line, through a variety of social assistance/welfare programs. Let us illustrate this with two contrasting examples:
A person working with the Indian army retires in the rank of Major and gets PF and gratuity totalling Rs. 20 to 25 lakhs as retirement benefits. Then for life he gets half of his last drawn salary as inflation-indexed pension, which today is over Rs.50,000 per month. If he dies, his spouse gets a family pension of half that amount that is Rs.25,000 for her life. Apart from this they have unlimited free healthcare, outpatient, inpatient, dental, ophthalmic etc. In addition they get subsidized groceries and all possible consumer products at subsidized rates through the canteen services. They also get continued access to the mess and clubs so that they remain socially connected to their “community”.  This is the best case scenario and about 15% of the households in India have this kind or something similar as social security benefits earned from their “organized” sector employment.
In contrast there is the BPL family of a daily wage worker, whose daily wage depends on the market – if they are lucky they may just manage to earn about Rs. 5000 for the entire household in a month. They have access to education and healthcare services from government facilities but there is no guarantee that they would get what they need and often they have to pay for it. The children may not go to school because they may have to work to sustain the family’s basic needs. They have no savings, PF, gratuity or any other work related benefits. They have to continue working much beyond the retirement age. If they fit the parameters then they may get a small sum of Rs. 200 – 500 per month as an old age or widow pension that is not indexed to inflation. If both husband and wife are qualified to get old age pension then only one of them will get it. If they are lucky they may have been registered for RSBY or a similar health insurance cover so that if there is a catastrophic illness their healthcare bill is atleast partly paid. This is the worst case scenario with two thirds of the households in India experiencing an existence of near about this kind.
The remaining 20% “middle” classes have to struggle to make their own arrangements for social security through their savings, extended family/community support – they did not get the organized sector benefits and they are not eligible for the various social assistance programs of state and central governments.
Given the above political economy of social security in India the challenge is huge. We are committing only about 6% of GDP for social security and over half of this goes to the top 15% of India’s population.  In the last decade or so there has been a growing trend in committing more resources to the remaining 85% of the population but this is being done in a very ad hoc manner through targeted schemes where the focus of the target is electoral catchment and not the development of a sustainable mechanism to deliver basic social security. Under the UPA regimes the flagship programs have basically tried to do precisely that and substantial budgetary allocations have been committed but the approach has been very fragmented with the consequence that outcomes in the form of improvements in for example the MDG indicators has been poor. There is enough learning now that targeted and fragmented approaches do not work and that universal access is the only way out.
Reforming ESIS thus has to be viewed in the above context. ESIS, like any other social security program in India is segmented through its design defect. While it was supposed to be a benefit for the workforce, it got limited to only a small part of the workforce because it limits extension of benefits to those earning a specified wage (presently Rs.15000 per month or less) and are part of an organization that employs more than 10 employees. Also its provisioning of services are restricted to areas which have a certain minimum density of eligible insured workers. The consequence of this is that only 3 percent of the workforce (and less than half of the so called organized workers) become eligible for ESIS benefits. Unless this design defect is not removed and the scheme is universalized to cover the entire workforce (450 million) its worthiness and effectiveness will remain questionable. The government is putting huge efforts and resources at extending health benefits to the unorganized sector through targeted and restricted schemes like RSBY and its state clones using the route of private health insurance but all these efforts fail to have the intended impact and end up benefiting the private hospitals and the insurance companies. The ESIS benefit system which is otherwise well formulated and is quite comprehensive can easily become the mechanism to expand social health insurance to almost the entire workforce, and its integration with the general healthcare services of the state can create a synergy wherein the required resources can be pooled from employers and employees contributions and that from tax revenues. Some suggestions on how this could be done are given below:
Coverage: As an immediate step the ESIC must amend the criteria that restricts coverage based on quantum of wages and/or the number of employees of an establishment. The effect of this would be that all employees of currently covered organizations would be compulsorily covered. This would more than double the numbers covered by ESIS but more importantly increase five to six fold the contributions from employers and employees since the higher paid employees are presently exempt from ESIS inclusion. As a next step ESIS should be extended to all employers from the shopkeeper or household artisan who may be employing as less as one or two persons – this would not be easy as registration of small establishments is grossly inadequate. Further all self-employed persons (professionals, farmers, artisans, vendors etc) should also be allowed as members into ESIS. To assure equity employees earning less than Rs.10,000 per month (inflation-indexed) should be exempted from contributions. Similarly, employers and self-employed persons with a turnover of less than Rs.50,000 per month and/or income less than Rs.15,000 per month must also be exempt from contributions.
Provisioning: The general primary healthcare system and ESIS dispensaries (as well as other social insurance scheme dispensaries/clinics, including of railways, defence services, CGHS etc.) must be integrated into a common pool, including the empaneled private practitioners (for whom much more effective regulation would be required). Similarly, the ESIC hospitals need to be integrated with the general hospitals of the public health system. All facilities must be well equipped and resourced as per globally accepted norms (WHO, ILO etc.). The effort in provisioning must be to make the primary healthcare system entirely through public provisioning in the long run. Secondary and tertiary care is severely under-invested in public domain presently and here regulated purchasing from the private sector will be needed to fill in gaps. Further in both ESIS and general health services human resources, especially doctors and nurses, are grossly lacking and for this the creation of an IAS kind of cadre or something similar to the cadre system in the armed forces would be needed. Infact there is a lot ot learn from the armed forces and Railways health services in the matter of provisioning, management and governance.
Financing: General taxation would remain the main source for financing the entire healthcare system, but specific to the ESIS system the pattern of contributions should continue with the caveats mentioned in the paragraph on coverage above. With universal coverage of all workforce there would be a possibility of reducing the proportional contribution of employees since higher salaried employees from the CEO downwards would all be covered – ofcourse the economics of this would have to be worked out as the coverage increases. If even 50 percent of the workforce, including self-employed are covered under ESIS then more than half the resources needed for UAHC could come from social insurance contributions.
Governance: The ESIS is presently an autonomous Corporation under the Ministry of Labour but under a UAHC framework it will have to be merged with the governance mechanism designed for UAHC. As mentioned earlier healthcare services cannot be seen as a standalone service, it needs to be viewed as a compact of the social security benefits. But this is complicated because ESIC and many other social security benefits are under the domain of the federal government. Thus at the state level at best ESIC facilities, which are physically run by the state government, can be integrated for UAHC provisioning with the general health services to optimize the economies of scale as well as integrate the under-used ESIS capacity and over-crowding of many general public hospitals. Also other public sector facilities like defence, CGHS and railways should also be integrated into a common governance mechanism.




[1] For FY 2013-14 the ESIC estimated income is Rs. 10,140.81 crores, Revenue Expenditure Rs. 7119.18 crores and Capital outlay of Rs 2504 crores (http://esic.nic.in/Publications/StandardNote190813.pdf)
[2] CAG 2012: Combined Finance and Revenue Accounts 2010-11: Volume 1, Comptroller and Auditor General, GOI, New Delhi (Table 7 page 17)
[3] CAG 2012: op. cit. compiled from Vol 3
[4] ibid

Caste Background of Health Professionals in India

It is well known that there is inequitable distribution of healthcare professionals across social groups, especially for physicians. The census publishes this data every ten years and the NSSO also collects data on occupations (but does not publish disaggregated data listing various health professionals) but a literature search shows that this subject of caste background of health professionals is inadequately researched and discussed. Humanpower statistics published by the Institute for Applied Manpower Research provides information only for those in public services but does not disaggregate by caste. The SC and ST Commissions who should have a keen interest in such a profile too do not collate and provide any data/statistics about SC / ST occupational data. So generally there is very little information about caste and professions/occupations and this lack of information is indeed surprising given that there exists education and job quotas / reservations for the SC and ST, and now also for OBCs and Muslims.
In 2003 the World Health Survey by WHO and IIPS (2006) on Health Systems Performance Assessment provided an excellent profile of the health system in India but failed to record caste. However they classified households into income quintiles and this data shows some interesting patterns of health human resources. Bottom THREE quintiles did not have a single physician whereas the top quintile accounted for 83 percent of all physicians – not unexpected as doctors have a clear class character and generally class and caste go together so we can deduce that most physicians would also be from the upper caste groups. The 2001 census data in the Table below provides the evidence of the caste character of physicians.
With regard to nursing and midwifery too there was some concentration in the top 2 quintiles in the WHO survey – 61 percent of nurses. The bottom two quintiles had only 19 percent nurses. But for the support health staff the contribution of the bottom quintile was as much as 37 percent.
The 2001 census data in the following table gives a snapshot of the caste character of various healthcare professionals and the distribution patterns are not very dissimilar to what we see in the class distribution from the WHS 2003. The last three columns in the table tell the real story for each social group, Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) and Others. For the health professional groups the variances from the proportion in the population (non-agricultural workers as universe) for each social group is highly negatively skewed for the SCs and STs, the deficits being between 50 and 80 percent, but for the “others” group it is in excess between 10 to 15 percent. As we move down the hierarchy to nurses and paramedics the variances become narrower and one sees a few excess ratios for SC and ST, notably for the category of sanitarians and nursing/midwifery. For the ST the nursing and midwifery categories surprisingly show a huge excess of over 100 percent. Thus despite affirmative action policies the SC and ST have been unable to break the glass ceiling of upper caste control over the health professions, especially physicians of all types.
Further, the “others “ is a very varied group and includes a number of underprivileged categories like OBCs and Muslims. If further disaggregation for this category was available the upper caste domination, similar to upper class (top quintile) would have come out more sharply. Historical evidence from Gazetteers, Indian Medical Service Reports and writings on colonial medicine suggest that the Brahmins, Parsis and Christians were the first to take advantage of modern medical education and hence they got a head start. Their domination continued in early Independent India but soon other upper caste Hindus, initially Kshatriyas and later baniyas entered the medical profession in large numbers. With reservations for dalits and adivasis they too got an opportunity to enter medical schools. As medicine got commodified, especially post 1980s, and private medical education and
Table 1: Caste Profile of Health Professionals and paramedics for all non-agricultural workforce 2001 Census India Economic Tables B-25, B-25SC and B-25ST           

Category of Worker
ALL
Caste  Category
Variance from Population proportion*
Occup. Code
A. Health Professionals
Persons
%SC
%ST
%Other
SC
ST
Others
2220
Health Professionals (except nursing)
947433
7.49
1.87
90.63
-42.65
-53.20
9.29
2221
Physicians and Surgeons, Allopathic
617619
7.49
1.50
91.01
-42.68
-62.46
9.74
2222
Physicians and Surgeons, Ayurvedic
107346
5.49
1.23
93.28
-58.01
-69.19
12.48
2223
Physicians and Surgeons, Homeopathic
64567
5.42
0.54
94.03
-58.50
-86.42
13.39
2224
Physicians and Surgeons, Unani
10020
3.96
0.49
95.55
-69.67
-87.78
15.21
2225
Dental Specialists
21261
6.00
1.17
92.83
-54.06
-70.86
11.94
2226
Veterinarians
81584
11.25
5.66
83.09
-13.86
41.27
0.19
2229
Health Professionals (Except Nursing), n.e.c.
45036
9.98
4.18
85.84
-23.59
4.38
3.50
2230
Nursing Professionals
14343
14.03
8.40
77.56
7.43
109.86
-6.47
2230
Nursing Professionals
14343
14.03
8.40
77.56
7.43
109.86
-6.47
B. Paramedic/Associate professionals
3220
Modern Health Associate Professionals (Except Nursing)
545579
11.62
4.11
84.27
-11.06
2.66
1.61
3221
Medical Assistants
91676
8.78
3.64
87.58
-32.78
-9.16
5.61
3222
Sanitarians
164955
14.43
4.84
80.73
10.49
20.87
-2.66
3223
Dieticians and Nutritionists
3321
10.42
2.68
86.90
-20.25
-33.06
4.79
3224
Optometrists and Opticians
12665
6.52
0.81
92.66
-50.08
-79.69
11.74
3225
Dental Assistants
2461
7.07
1.67
91.26
-45.88
-58.39
10.05
3226
Physiotherapists and Related Associate Professionals
6727
7.63
1.14
91.23
-41.63
-71.41
10.00
3227
Veterinary Assistants
27966
10.55
4.16
85.29
-19.26
3.97
2.84
3228
Pharmaceutical Assistants
221552
11.24
3.24
85.52
-13.95
-19.09
3.12
3229
Modern Health Associate Professionals (except Nursing) n.e.c.
14256
12.71
17.23
70.06
-2.71
330.33
-15.52
3230
Nursing and Midwifery Associate Professionals
583284
12.90
5.87
81.23
-1.28
46.67
-2.05
3231
Nursing Associate Professionals
491151
11.54
5.13
83.33
-11.69
28.20
0.48
3232
Midwifery Associate Professionals
92133
20.15
9.81
70.04
54.23
145.15
-15.55
3240
Traditional Medicine Practitioners and Faith Healers
11488
9.48
2.99
87.53
-27.44
-25.42
5.55
3241
Traditional Medicine Practitioners
10885
9.55
3.01
87.44
-26.94
-24.73
5.44
3242
Faith Healers
603
8.29
2.49
89.22
-36.53
-37.86
7.58
0000
TOTAL Non Agricultural WORKERS
145509200
13.06
4.00
82.93

Note: The variance has been calculated using the total non-agricultural workers, and within that the proportion of respective social group as the universe.  *Negative figure means that the proportion is lower by that much percentage as per their population proportion for the concerned social group and a positive figure reflects that it is that much higher

private health insurance entered the scene upper caste domination (being coterminous with upper and middle classes), especially of baniyas got consolidated further.
While the above data is only for a single year, the trend over time would show similar adversity for SCs and STs if not worse, assuming that the affirmative action policy has had some impact in accessing jobs and education enrolment by them in atleast public institutions. In Table 2 an abstract profile of health professionals for Maharashtra for 1991 is compiled. This shows that even in a developed state like Maharashtra which has seen many reform movements and has a politically strong dalit  movement the deficit among SCs and STs as health professionals is very high – similar to the 2001 India average. So it is clear that the impact of affirmative action for becoming a health professional is very limited and the predominance in this profession of upper castes continues to rule.
Table 2: Caste Profile of Health Professionals and paramedics in Maharashtra for all non-agricultural workforce - Maharashtra Census 1991 Economic Tables B-21 and SC & ST Special Tables
Maharashtra 1991 Census
Variance from population proportion
Occupation
Persons
%SC
%ST
% Other
SC
ST
Other
Physician & Surgeons*
92419
5.27
1.59
93.14
-49.57
-62.75
9.21
Nurses, Midwives &Paramedics
131178
14.32
3.33
82.35
37.11
-22.06
-3.44
Medical Scientists
8535
4.93
1.58
93.48
-52.77
-62.93
9.61
* Includes pharmacists and nutritionists, which in 2001 census are part of paramedics


To conclude the adverse experience of dalit and adivasi doctors, nurses and other health workers is reported regularly by the media. An excellent documentation of the personal experience of a dalit cardiac surgeon from Maharashtra reveals how difficult it is for dalits to get into the profession and when they get in, to survive. (Dr. Ashok Bhoyar – My Encounter with Dronacharya, Sugava Prakashan, Pune 2001). The dalits and adivasis suffer a double adversity of their social disadvantage as well as their class position and unless there is radical transformation in the structure of medical education and the healthcare system on one hand and the social discrimination based on caste on the other we will not witness any progressive change.